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Note
Capturing the Ghost:
Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to
Solve Procedural Concerns with Ghostwriting
Jeffrey P. Justman*
Rosann Delso was in a bind. Unable to afford an attorney
to represent her in a disability benefits claim on behalf of her
deceased husband, Delso decided to pursue her case against
pharmaceutical giant Merck on her own.1 Such pro se 2 representations pose significant challenges, as Delso soon learned;
complex filing requirements left Delso feeling frustrated and
confused. 3 To help her navigate these procedural minefields,
Delso turned to attorney Richard Shapiro for help. 4 Delso knew
Shapiro from his work with her husband's union at Merck, so
she asked Shapiro to "informally assist" her in drafting the
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004,
Carleton College. The author thanks David Jenson, Marie Quasius, Nick
Smith, Jenni Vainik and the many other Minnesota Law Review editors and
staff who offered comments and helpful suggestions in the early stages of this
Note. Special thanks to Professor Laura J. Cooper for her guidance in selecting
this topic and in proposing revisions to earlier drafts. Marilyn Kaman and Richard Justman provided endless parental love and support for which the author is ever grateful. Finally, the author wishes to thank the breakfast club for
its thought-provoking discussions of privileges and immunities and the proper
scope of legal ethics, which only cemented the author's belief that lawyers
need ethical rules to guide their behavior. Copyright © 2008 by Jeffrey P.
Justman.
1. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck &
Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
2. The term "pro se" means "on one's own behalf" and describes litigants
who appear in court without any attorney representation. BLAcK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). Some jurisdictions also refer to this representation alternatively as "in propria persona," State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Ethics Op. 05-06 (2005) [hereinafter Ariz. Ethics Op.
05-06], or as "in pro per" representation, L.A. County Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 502 (1999) [hereinafter L.A. County
Formal Op. 502].
3. Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *4.
4. Id.
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documents she submitted to the court. 5 Shapiro agreed to this
limited representation, rather than the traditional "full-service
model,"6 because of his concern that his previous employment

for the union would pose a conflict of interest. 7 By drafting documents for Delso without signing his name, Shapiro believed
he could satisfy the court's filing requirements without violating any procedural or ethical rules.8
Unfortunately for Shapiro, a federal court in New Jersey
disagreed. 9 In an opinion critical of Shapiro, the court explained that when attorneys provide such informal assistance,
or "ghostwriting," they violate procedural and ethical rules. 10 It
noted that by failing to sign his name to court documents, Shapiro avoided the responsibility that the procedural rules impose
on him, and violated ethical rules of candor and honesty. 1 Ultimately, the court ordered Shapiro to either enter an appearance to fully represent Delso or cease representing her altogether.

12

Richard Shapiro is just one of many attorneys to engage in
the practice of ghostwriting in recent years. 13 These attorneys,
5. Id.
6. Under the traditional full-service model, legal services are a single
product, including "advice, fact investigation, legal research, drafting correspondence and pleadings, negotiation, representation at hearings, formal discovery, and trial." Helen Hierschbiel, The Ethics of Unbundling: How to Avoid
the Land Mines of 'Discrete Task Representation,"OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2007,
at 9, 9, available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin07jul]
barcounsel.html.
7. Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *4.
8. Id. at *4 n.3.
9. Id. at 17-18.
10. Id. at *12-18 (explaining that ghostwriting violates a state ethics rule
requiring a lawyer's candor and honesty to tribunals, and also offends Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
11.

Id. at "15.

12. Id. at *18.
13. See, e.g., Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL
4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (explaining that an attorney evidently provided "substantial assistance" to a putative pro se litigant); Anderson v.
Duke Energy Corp., No. 3:06cv399, 2007 WL 4284904, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C.
Dec. 4, 2007) ("[I]f counsel is preparing the documents being filed by the Plaintiff in this action, the undersigned would take a dim view of that practice.");
Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala.
Sept. 25, 2007) ("The level of sophistication, polish and legal research contained in plaintiff's filings strongly suggest that they were ghostwritten by
counsel."); Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007
WL 1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007) (noting that the complaint "appears to have been ghostwritten").
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as well as some commentators, justify ghostwriting as a practice that gives low-income litigants increased access to civil representation they otherwise would not be able to afford. 14 Such
arguments are persuasive, especially given pro se litigants' ever-growing need for legal representation. 15 Yet as opponents
note, ghostwriting, at least when not disclosed to courts, raises
serious procedural and ethical problems. 16 Ethically, an attorney's failure to disclose her assistance on a client's pleadings
may violate rules requiring the attorney to be candid and honest. 17 Procedurally, ghostwriting may give putative pro se litigants an unfair advantage, and may decrease the efficiency of
court proceedings.' 8 Most importantly, ghostwriting may violate an attorney's obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) to certify that pleadings she signs are wellgrounded in fact and in law.19
This Note examines the procedural and ethical issues surrounding the practice of ghostwriting. Part I describes the rise
of ghostwriting in recent years, paying particular attention to
the arguments offered to justify or criticize the practice. Part II
analyzes previous proposals to resolve the ghostwriting problem from an exclusively procedural perspective, and questions
whether such proposals adequately address the goals of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Part III offers a solution to the procedural problems ghostwriting poses: courts
should broaden the scope of Rule 11 to indicate clearly when attorneys must sign pleadings they draft. By amending Rule 11

14. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1145, 1208 (2002); John C. Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of "Ghostwriting" for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased
Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2728 (1999).
15. See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 373,
376-77 (2005) (noting the increasing frequency of pro se litigation).
16. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *14-18 (arguing that ghostwriting
violates ethics rules requiring attorneys to be candid to courts); Carol A.
Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices:
Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1315, 1334-35 (2000) (discussing how courts and ethics boards in several
states condemn ghostwriting).
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2004) (indicating
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct "involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
18. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *14-18; Rothermich, supra note
14, at 2696-720.
19. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *15-17; Rothermich, supra note
14, at 2716-20.
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and its federal and state civil court analogs, 20 courts can ensure
that attorneys take responsibility for the documents they help
draft, while also providing clarity for attorneys who wish to assist pro se litigants. In short, courts need to incentivize disclosure, something that previous ghostwriting proposals have
failed to do.
I. THE RISE OF GHOSTWRITING
Ghostwriting is best understood by examining the broader
category of "unbundled legal services" or "limited scope representation" under which it falls. 21 Unlike traditional models of
legal representation, in which an attorney represents a client
from the beginning of a case or transaction to its ultimate conclusion, unbundled representations arise when attorneys limit
their service to discrete tasks. 22 Such tasks include fact gathering, legal research, coaching, negotiating, making limited court
appearances, or drafting court documents. 23 Indeed, unbundled
services can take countless forms, varying with the needs of the
24
individual client.
So-called limited scope representation is not in itself a new
development in attorney-client representation. 25 In many
transactional fields, unbundled legal services are commonplace,
with attorneys assisting clients in discrete tasks ranging from
contract drafting to negotiation of purchase agreements. 26 A
lawyer's assistance in such transactions may constitute a sub20. E.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; MINN. R. Civ. P. 11.
21. E.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *12 (listing synonyms for unbundled
legal services as "discrete tasks legal services" and "limited scope legal assistance"); Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice
for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 565 (2007) (describing

these services alternatively as "unbundled legal services" or 'limited scope representation"); see also N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 713 (2008)
[hereinafter N.J. Ethics Op. 713], available at www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
notices/ethics/ACPE713.pdf (dubbing this kind of representation "short-term
limited legal services").
22. Farley, supra note 21, at 565.
23. Rochelle Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services in New York State Litigated Matters: A Proposal to Test the Efficacy Through Law School Clinics, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 653, 654 (2006); Rothermich, supra note 14, at
2691.
24. Klempner, supra note 23, at 654.
25. Hierschbiel, supra note 6, at 9.
26. David M. Forman, Unbundled Legal Services, HAW. B.J., Aug. 2001, at
20, 20; Sylvia Stevens, Understanding'Unbundling.-Creatinga Menu of Legal
Services May Improve Accessibility, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1998, at 25, 25.
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stantial percentage of the client's overall project, or it may be
limited to a mere review of documents already created by the
27
client.
For many years limited scope representation remained
largely a transactional phenomenon; clients needing litigation
assistance either chose to hire attorneys for the entire duration
of their case, or opted to pursue their claims alone. 28 Unfortunately, neither option meets the needs of many civil litigants,
especially those of limited means. 29 On one hand, pro se representation often leads to unnecessary delays, unfair negotiations, and skewed case outcomes. 30 Because pro se litigants ordinarily lack legal training and expertise, they may have a
greater chance of losing on procedural grounds, 31 despite the
Supreme Court's mandate that pro se pleadings be held to "less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."32 Conversely, full-service representation often proves too

costly for many low-income civil litigants. 33 While legal service
organizations and pro bono programs provide some impoverished individuals with legal representation, 34 these programs
lack sufficient resources to meet the growing need for civil representation among low-income earners. 35
27. Klempner, supra note 23, at 654; Stevens, supra note 26, at 25.
28. See Klempner, supra note 23, at 654 (noting that unbundled legal services are "far less established and common in the litigation context").
29. See Swank, supra note 15, at 376 (noting the increase of pro se litigants in so-called poor people courts).
30. Brenda Star Adams, Note, "Unbundled Legal Services" A Solution to
the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts's Civil Courts, 40
NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306-13 (2005).
31. Id. at 308-10.
32. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
33. See Raymond P. Micklewright, Discrete Task Representation a/k/a
Unbundled Legal Services, COLO. LAw., Jan. 2000, at 5, 5 (arguing that clients
forego attorney assistance because it is "unnecessarily expensive"); Anthony
Zapata, Legal 'Ghostwriting'in Indiana:An Analysis, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2005,
at 20, 23; Adams, supra note 30, at 304.
34. Minnesota and Arizona have self-service centers that cater to lowincome, self-represented litigants, and other states have court-sponsored clinics that educate pro se litigants about court procedures. Adams, supra note 30,
at 304-05; see also Zapata, supra note 33, at 20-21 (noting that many state
supreme courts have created pro se advisory boards to advise self-represented
litigants).
35. See Farley, supra note 21, at 563 (explaining that legal services organizations and pro bono programs only meet fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
need of the nation's poor); Micklewright, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that the
Legal Services Corporation turns away "thousands of potential clients annually because of cutbacks in funding").
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Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the problem impoverished
individuals have in achieving adequate legal representation.
According to several national and state studies, nearly eighty
percent of the nation's poor have unmet legal needs. 36 Pro se
representation is a manifestation of this problem, as legal aid
attorneys are not able to provide legal representation in the
same manner as attorneys in private practice.37 In some specialized contexts, including traffic, housing, family, and small
38
claims courts, pro se litigants are particularly ubiquitous.
Given that pro se litigants may be disadvantaged by the lack of
an attorney, 39 these figures suggest40 that traditional models of
legal representation are ineffective.
In response to the ever-increasing needs of low-income individuals, many jurisdictions have allowed limited scope representation in litigation. 4 1 This process first involved revising ap36.

ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL

JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL

NEEDS STUDY 9

(1996) [hereinafter ABA,

AGENDA FOR ACCESS],

available at

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/agendaforaccess.pdf
(concluding that "many low- and moderate-income Americans confront legal
issues in their lives and receive no help"); LEGAL SERV. CORP., DOCUMENTING
THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 18 (2005) [hereinafter JUSTICE GAP], available at

http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf; ALGODONES ASSOCS., THE AMERICAN BAR
http://www
(1998),
6
STUDY
NEEDS
LEGAL
ASSOCIATION
.algodonesassociates.com/legal-services/assessing-needs/ABA%20Legal%2ONe
eds.pdf (concluding that between sixty-one and seventy-five percent "of all lowincome legal needs are unmet").
37. See JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (noting that on average there is
one legal aid attorney for every 6861 people nationally while there is one private practice attorney for every 525 people in the population); Beth Lynch
Murphy, Results of a National Survey of Pro Se Assistance Programs: A Preliminary Report, http://www.ajs.org/prose/promurphy.asp (last visited Mar.
12, 2008) (indicating that over ninety-five percent of state respondents to an
American Judicature Society study reported that there had been an increase
in pro se litigation in their courts in the previous five years).
38. See Memorandum from Madelynn Herman, Pro Se Statistics (Sept. 25,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Memos/
available at
2006),
ProSeStatsMemo.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) (listing state court pro se
statistics for domestic relations matters, such as divorce, small claims, landlord/tenant, probate, and other civil matters).
39. See Adams, supra note 30, at 308-10.
40. See Hierschbiel, supra note 6, at 9 ("Improving access to justice in the
face of decreasing government funding and rising legal costs continues to challenge the legal community.").
41. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 11(b); ME. R. CIV. P. 11(b); WASH. SUPER. CT.
CIV. R. 11(b); Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Op. on Prof'l Conduct No. 849
(1983) (concluding that an attorney may agree in advance with his client to
limit the attorney's employment to drafting court documents, as long as the
client gives his informed consent to such a limitation of employment).
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plicable ethics rules to expressly permit limited representations.42 The American Bar Association (ABA) and some state
ethics boards have rewritten ethics rules to allow a lawyer to
limit his representation if such a representation is "reasonable
under the circumstances" and if the client gives informed consent. 43 Accordingly, attorneys can assist a civil litigant at any of
several points from before a case is filed until its ultimate resolution. 44 An attorney's assistance may be brief, such as providing advice concerning a narrow issue in the litigation, or it may
involve the more time-consuming tasks of drafting court docu45
ments or teaching a client to represent herself pro se. It is
during this more extensive involvement that ghostwriting arises.
A. DEFINITION OF AND REASONS FOR GHOSTWRITING
Ghostwriting occurs when an attorney "prepares documents for filing for a party who would otherwise appear unrepresented in litigation." 46 While many courts focus on ghostwriters who draft pleadings, 47 ghostwriting also applies to the
drafting of motions, notices, or other court documents. 48 An attorney is only a ghostwriter if he or she provides "substantial
legal assistance to a pro se litigant, but does not enter appear49
ance or otherwise identify himself or herself in the litigation."
Attorneys who either disclose their assistance to a court, or who

42. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable
under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.").
43. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 6 (explaining that limited representation may be
appropriate when the client has limited objectives for the representation); id.
R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (noting that limited representation would not be appropriate

when, for example, the attorney's limited work would be insufficient to yield
advice on which the client could rely).
44. Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2691.
45. Id.
46. In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
47. See, e.g., In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426, 435 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1999) (defining ghostwriting as the "act of an undisclosed attorney who assists
a self-represented litigant by drafting his or her pleadings as part of 'unbun-

dled' or limited legal services" (emphasis added)).
48. See, e.g., In re Brown (Brown 1), 354 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2006) (discussing ghostwriting of a motion to reconsider); Jackson v. Am. Lubricant Co., No. 18482, 2001 WL 221661, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001)
(same).
49. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 885 (D. Kan. 1997).
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provide minor undocumented
assistance to a client are not con50
sidered ghostwriters.
Although the type of assistance that may be deemed "substantial" initially seems difficult to ascertain, several authorities have attempted to clarify this ambiguity. 51 In the Southern
District of California, attorneys ghostwrite by drafting "seventy-five to one hundred percent" of a client's document, or by
presenting arguments "with the actual or constructive knowledge that the work will be presented in some similar form in a
motion before the Court."52 For the First Circuit, any docu-

ments "manifestly written" by an attorney qualify.5 3 The ABA
defines ghostwriting as "active and extensive" assistance "in
preparation for the trial as well as during the trial itself,"54 a
55
formulation dubbed the "substantial assistance approach."
Whatever the precise definition, the term ghostwriting applies
when a court perceives that an attorney is guiding the course of
56
litigation "with an unseen hand."

Precisely because ghostwriting occurs behind the scenes, it
is not altogether clear why attorneys choose to help draft pleadings and other court documents for pro se litigants without disclosure.5 7 Yet an analysis of ghostwriting cases reveals several
50. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that an attorney must play a "substantial role in the litigation" to
qualify as a ghostwriter).
51. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (defining "substantial" by the amount of the brief preparation allocable to the attorney); Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Brown I, 354 B.R. at 544 (noting that the drafting
of pleadings constitutes substantial assistance); Lauren A. Weeman, Note,
Bending the (Ethical) Rules in Arizona: Ethics Opinion 05-06's Approval of
Undisclosed GhostwritingMay Be a Sign of Things to Come, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1041, 1058-60 (2006) (explaining the "substantial assistance approach" to defining ghostwriting); cf. In re Eastlick, 349 B.R. 216, 221 n.17
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (explaining that preparation of a bankruptcy petition,
schedules, and statements constitutes "material" participation, which is improper if not disclosed).
52. Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
53. Ellis, 448 F.2d at 1328.
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414
(1978) [hereinafter ABA Informal Op. 1414].
55. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1058.
56. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Several authorities note the difficulty in analyzing ghostwriting because of the inability to identify ghostwriters. See In re Brown (Brown I), 354
B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (berating a ghostwriting attorney for
playing "a game of 'catch-me-if-you-can"'); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326
B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (dubbing ghostwriting "sub-rosa beha-
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broad explanations for the practice. These justifications include
a desire to avoid ethical or procedural rules, the fear of adverse
legal or social consequences, and an effort to gain an advantage
for the client.
1. Avoiding Ethical and Procedural Rules
First, several cases indicate that attorneys ghostwrite documents to circumvent applicable procedural and ethical rules.
In In re West, for example, an attorney who failed to comply
properly with a bankruptcy court's electronic filing system instead coached his client to submit paper motions, on the premise that a pro se client's failure to abide by electronic submission requirements would be forgiven while an attorney's would
not. 58 Recognizing the attorney's attempt to circumvent the
pleading rules, the court held that the attorney violated the
bankruptcy analog to Rule 11 and imposed $1000 in sanctions. 59
In re Potter provides another example of ghostwriting to
circumvent local court rules. 60 There, an attorney who was not
licensed to practice in the District of New Mexico wrote court
notices for a putative pro se litigant appearing in bankruptcy
court. 61 The court declared that this effort to "circumvent and

manipulate" the bankruptcy process was "unacceptable," 62 and
prohibited the attorney from representing any party pro hac
64
vice 63 in the future.

vior"); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (condemning
ghostwriters for shielding themselves in a "cloak of anonymity"); ABA Committee Abandons Previous Stance That Required Revealing GhostwritingLawyers, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at 352 (July 11, 2007)
(characterizing ghostwriters as "shadow lawyers").
58. See 338 B.R. 906, 909-10 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
59. Id. at 914-15, 917.
60. See In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4 (Bankr.
D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Attorneys appearing pro hac vice are not licensed to appear before a
particular court, but, with court approval, may do so "[f]or this occasion or
particular purpose." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1227 (7th ed. 1999).
64. In re Potter, 2007 WL 2363104, at *4; see also Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Sys., 303 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772-73 (E.D. Va. 2004) (admonishing
an attorney for similar behavior); cf. Te-Ta-Ma Truth Found.-Family of URI,
Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 246 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(criticizing a "non-attorney law school graduate" for potentially ghostwriting
court documents).
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Avoiding potential conflicts of interest represents another
reason attorneys choose to ghostwrite for pro se litigants. Delso
v. Trustees for the Retirement Plan for the Hourly Employees of
Merek & Co. is the most obvious example of this phenomenonattorney Shapiro was concerned that his previous representation of the union at Merck would have been adverse to his representation of Rosann Delso. 65 Although the court ultimately
found no conflict present, 66 Delso nevertheless demonstrates
that attorneys may decide to ghostwrite in order to conceal conflicts of interest from the court. 67 Previous cases bolster this
conclusion. In both Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kimball,68 and In re Brown (Brown J),69 an attorney withdrew or
was disqualified from representing a party because of a possible conflict of interest, and yet continued to assist that party
through ghostwriting.70
In fact, Brown I is broadly representative of a growing
class of ghostwriting cases found in bankruptcy courts. 71 As the
procedural history of Brown I indicates, 72 ethics rules may prevent attorneys from representing debtors in multiple bankruptcy proceedings.7 3 The problem in Brown I arose from attorney
65. See Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck
& Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
66. Id. at *18.
67. It is important to note that in Delso, Richard Shapiro encouraged Rosann Delso to inform the court of his assistance drafting her motions. Id. at *4
n.3.
68. 168 F.R.D. 69, 71 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
69. In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
70. For other examples of conflicts of interest as manifested through
ghostwriting, see Alling v. Am. Tool & Grinding Co., 96 F.R.D. 221, 223 (D.
Colo. 1982), and Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Lawson, 933 A.2d 842, 850
& n.1 (Md. 2007).
71. See, e.g., In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4
(Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Brown (Brown II), 371 B.R. 486, 493
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007), amended by 371 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007);
Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541-46; In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-15 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys., 326 B.R. 655, 673-75 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 767-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam,

250 B.R. 724, 732-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
72. For the 2007 iteration of the case, see Brown II, 371 B.R. at 493. For
the 2006 version, see Brown I, 354 B.R. at 539-40.
73. For example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.8, which
prohibit an attorney from representing a client with a concurrent or successive
conflict of interest, may prohibit an attorney in bankruptcy court from
representing a debtor if the attorney himself was a prepetition secured creditor of the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8 (2004); see also
Brown II, 371 B.R. at 491-93.
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James Matthews's multiple representations of the Brown family. 74 Having earned attorneys' fees representing the Browns in
2003, Matthews secured a promissory note under which the
Browns owed him $30,000 for his legal work. 75 When the family
later required more bankruptcy assistance, Matthews was
forced to withdraw because the promissory note Brown owed
constituted an interest "adverse" to the Browns. 76 Not wanting
to leave his former clients without representation, Matthews
continued to draft court documents, a practice the court formally admonished. 77 The proliferation of ghostwriting78 in bankruptcy cases suggests that this scenario is not unique.
Fear of Adverse Legal or Social Consequences
A report of the Minnesota State Bar Association Pro Se
Implementation Committee noted that unbundled services like
ghostwriting also arise out of attorneys' fears of being conscripted into full-service representation. 79 Under this rationale,
ghostwriters do not disclose their identity because they believe
doing so would require them to assume additional obligations
like court appearances and negotiations with opposing counsel
for which they simply do not have time.8 0 While these fears
may seem unfounded because of ethics rules permitting limited
representation, 8 ' some attorneys nevertheless worry that inexperienced pro se litigants cannot handle other aspects of the
2.

74. See Brown I, 371 B.R. at 493; Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541.
75. Brown II, 371 B.R. at 491.
76. Id. at 492.
77. Id. at 493.
78. See, e.g., In re Bell, 212 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (noting
another attorney's attempt to avoid a conflict of interest through ghostwriting).
79. MINN. STATE BAR ASS'N PRO SE IMPLEMENTATION CoMM., REPORT OF
THE MSBA PRO SE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MAY 2003 TO 2006, at 7,
http://www2.mnbar.org/committees/pro-se/CommitteeFinalReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2008) [hereinafter MSBA REPORT] (explaining that "fear of having to stay on a case forever" and "being unable to withdraw" is one principal
concern related to unbundled legal services); see also Elizabeth J. Cohen,
Afraid of Ghosts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 80, 80 (arguing that the dangers of
ghostwriting lie in the possibility that a "very real lawyer-client relationship
may have been formed, with all its attendant obligations").
80. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198 (arguing that a ghostwriter,
among other motives, wants to "avoid being forced to stay in the case by a
judge who may decide that, once he appears, his withdrawal motion should be
denied").
81. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004).
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case on their own, thus requiring the ghostwriting attorney to
8 2
continue the representation.
On a less tangible level, an attorney's negative reputation
with a judge or opposing counsel might give the attorney-pause
in disclosing ghostwriting assistance.8 3 If an attorney and an
assigned judge lack a good relationship, the attorney might
worry that disclosure of his assistance will adversely affect the
client.8 4 The anonymity of ghostwriting thus serves as a security blanket to protect the client's legal rights.
Similarly, ghostwriters may fail to disclose their assistance
for social reasons. Professor Jona Goldschmidt identified several scenarios in which disclosure of an attorney's assistance
might negatively impact the attorney's social standing because
of an "unpopular pro se client."8 5 An attorney concerned about
how an employer, a bar association, a local judge, or the public
at large would view representation of an unpopular client may
ghostwrite the documents to afford the client legal representation without risking harm to the attorney's reputation. 86
3.

Gaining an Advantage for the Client

Finally, the most oft-cited reason attorneys choose to
ghostwrite documents is a desire to take advantage of the latitude courts provide pro se litigants.8 7 Almost every case to discuss ghostwriting has suggested that attorneys use ghostwriting as a strategy to gain an advantage for their clients.88 This
argument seems logical, given that courts construe pro se
pleadings more liberally than those of represented parties, and
82. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Scary Parts of Ghostwriting, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 2007, at 16, 17 (explaining lawyers' fear that pro se litigants 'might not
be truly able to handle other aspects of the case on their own,"' and that lawyers question where their responsibilities with limited representations begin
and end).
83. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
88. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso v.
Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009,
2007 WL 766349, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); Ricotta v. California, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762,
769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo.
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afford pro se litigants wide latitude at trial.8 9 Some commentators and ethics opinions reject this conclusion, instead arguing
that the obviousness of the assistance will prevent courts from
giving putative pro se clients any extra advantage. 90 Whatever
the ultimate validity of these arguments, theoretically at least,
ghostwriting attorneys employ this tactic as a means to gain an
advantage for their clients.
While this is certainly not a comprehensive list, it does
shed light on ghostwriters' fundamental reasons for failing to
disclose their assistance to courts. Importantly, many of these
rationales suggest that ghostwriters shield their identities out
of a desire to avoid adverse ethical and procedural consequences. These explanations will prove vital in Part III, because any viable solution to ghostwriting must address courts'
and attorneys' concerns.
B. CRITICISMS OF GHOSTWRITING

Courts and ethics opinions have criticized ghostwriting for
both ethical 9' and procedural reasons. 9 2 On the ethics side, opponents invoke two principal concerns. First, they argue that
ghostwriters violate ethical duties of candor to tribunals and
third parties. 93 A Colorado court, for example, explained that
ghostwriting was "far below the level of candor which must be
met by members of the bar."94 The candor argument is rooted in

the proscription Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) 3.3(a)(1) and 4.1(a) place on making false statements of
89.

E.g., Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231 (noting that "pleadings filed prose

are to be interpreted liberally" and that pro se litigants are granted "greater
latitude" in subsequent court hearings and at trial).
90. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07446 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 07-446]; Goldschmidt, supra note 14,
at 1157-59.
91. E.g., Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) (describing ghostwriting as "unprofessional conduct"
that is "patently unfair"); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (explaining that
ghostwriting violates "the duty of honesty and candor to the court").
92. E.g., Knight-McConnell v. Cummins, No. 03 Civ. 5035, 2005 WL
1398590, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (explaining that ghostwriting
raises "concerns under Rule 11"); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (noting that
ghostwriting violates Rule 11 and "interferes with the efficient administration
of justice").
93. See, e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 98-1 (1998)
(noting that ghostwriting litigation documents "would usually be misleading to
the court and to other parties, and therefore would be prohibited"); Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2697.
94. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232.

2008]

GHOSTWRITING

1259

material fact to tribunals and third parties. 95 By permitting
clients to submit documents pro se, ghostwriters arguably
create a "false impression of the real state of affairs" by permitting clients to imply that the documents were created without
legal assistance. 96 In any court with the equivalent to Model
Rules 3.3 or 4.1, ghostwriting arguably constitutes miscon97
duct.
Similarly, critics contend that ghostwriting may violate
Model Rule 8.4(c), which proscribes conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."9 8 One ethics opinion
explained that "non-disclosure" of an attorney's assistance to a
pro se litigant is a misrepresentation, at least where the assistance is "active and substantial or includes the drafting of
pleadings." 99 Some courts agree, noting that ghostwriting violates either Rule 8.4(c) 100 or Rule 8.4(d) as conduct "prejudicial
to the administration of justice."'101
Procedurally, ghostwriting implicates both of the fundamental aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal

95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2004) ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal
by the lawyer."); id. R. 4.1(a) ("In the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person.").
96. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 98-5 (1998)
[hereinafter Conn. Informal Op. 98-5]; see also Va. State Bar Standing Comm.
on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 1592 (1994) (explaining that a failure to disclose
an attorney's assistance "may also be a misrepresentation to the court and to
opposing counsel").
97. The Model Rules are not binding authority on any particular jurisdiction; instead, as their name suggests, they serve as templates on which states
may base their rules of professional conduct. See E. Norman Veasey, Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at xv (2004) (noting the variations
in adopting the Model Rules among the fifty states and the District of Columbia).
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2004).
99. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987) [hereinafter City of N.Y. Formal Op. 1987-2].
100. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck &
Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); Ostevoll v.
Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000);
Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1998); In re West, 338
B.R. 906, 915 n.36 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 76970 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (explaining that ghostwriting violates the local equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)).
101. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso, 2007
WL 766349, at *14.

1260

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1246

Rules): fairness and efficiency. 10 2 One main concern with
ghostwriting from this perspective is the perception that it
gives pro se litigants an undue advantage over parties
represented by counsel. 103 Given the liberality attributed to
documents submitted by unrepresented parties, 104 applying a
stricter standard to pleadings signed by attorneys arguably
gives pro se litigants "unwarranted advantage" over their
represented counterparts. 105 Stated differently, ghostwriting
arguably creates a "disparity between the parties" by giving
two parties represented by lawyers different pleading standards. 106 Over time, courts' continued efforts to give "greater
latitude" to pro se litigants at trial may exacerbate this advantage. 10 7 Ghostwriting thus may have "the perverse effect of
skewing the playing field rather than leveling it."108
Courts have also asserted that the practice "interferes with
the efficient administration of justice."'1 9 Opinions addressing
efficiency issues note that overcrowded dockets require streamlined procedures. 110 Ghostwriting forces courts to order a
ghostwriter to reveal himself, an effort that inevitably takes
time away from other matters. 1' This so-called satellite litiga102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (explaining that the Rules should be administered to secure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" outcomes in every action).
103. See Duran, 238 F.3d at 1271-72; Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13; Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884,
885-86 (D. Kan. 1997); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr.,
968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966
F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F.
Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Brown (Brown 1), 354 B.R. 535, 542
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
104. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (noting
that pro se pleadings are held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
105. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231.
106. Somerset Pharms., Inc. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996);
see also In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (indicating
that ghostwriting "places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. Wesley, 987 F. Supp. at 886.
108. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
109. In re West, 338 B.R. at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted); In re
Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) (quoting Laremont-Lopez,
968 F. Supp. at 1078) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See, e.g., In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (explaining that ghostwriting "tax[ed] the Court's system" and "forc[ed] the Court
to expend more time and effort to handle the matter").
111. See, e.g., Stewart v. Angelone, 186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999)
("[T]he court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether
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tion is inefficient in that it prevents courts from adjudicating
issues on the merits. 112 Both Delso and In re West are examples
of this phenomenon, because both courts conducted hearings or
conferences to determine if an attorney was helping the putative pro se litigant. 113 These actions do not endear ghostwriters
to courts; one attorney was fined over $11,000 for having
"wasted" the court's "time and resources." 114
Perhaps the most fundamental arguments against
ghostwriting arise from Rule 11.115 At the core of the Federal
Rules is the requirement imposed by Rule 11 that every document be signed "by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not. represented by an
attorney, shall be signed by the party." 116 By presenting a
signed document in court, each attorney or unrepresented party certifies that the document is not being presented for an improper purpose, that the legal contentions are warranted by existing law, and that the allegations and factual contentions
have evidentiary support. 117 Attorneys, law firms, or parties responsible for violating any of those requirements may be subject to sanctions under Rule 11.118
Ghostwriters violate Rule 11 by escaping the certification
requirement in Rule 11(b) that an attorney has factual and legal support for the assertions she is making.1 1 9 Put another
way, "the extent of pre-filing factual investigation and legal research required to be done in a particular case may vary depending upon whether a party is represented by counsel or proceeding pro se." 120 Ghostwriters, knowing that a pleading will

be submitted by a pro se litigant, may consequently conduct
counsel intends to represent him in this case.").
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (7th ed. 1999) (defining satellite litigation as "[p]eripheral skirmishes involved in the prosecution of a lawsuit");
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary
on the Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 101 (1993).
113. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck &
Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); In re West, 338
B.R. at 910-13.
114. In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
115. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
116. Id. R. 11(a).
117.

Id. R. 11(b)(1)-(3).

118. Id. R. 11(c).
119. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971).
120. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa.
1997).

1262

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1246

more minimal research than if a document were submitted under the attorney's name. 121 Moreover, even if an attorney conducts a reasonable inquiry, by omitting his name, the attorney
leaves courts to speculate about the extent and thoroughness of
the legal research. Recognizing these concerns, courts addressing the issue have either held that ghostwriting is a per se violation of Rule 11,122 or that it "contravene[s] the spirit" of the
23
rule.1
These arguments pervade the commentary on ghostwriting, whether in court decisions, journal articles, or ethics opinions. From the undue advantage and Rule 11 concerns to
complaints about inefficiencies and conflicts of interest, these
arguments are important because they represent obstacles reformers must overcome. Accordingly, the solution in Part III attempts to resolve these problems by broadening the scope of
Rule 11 to indicate expressly the extent to which attorneys may
assist otherwise pro se parties.
C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GHOSTWRITING

Until recently, courts, ethics opinions, and scholarly commentary generally criticized the practice of ghostwriting. In
2002, however, the movement to support ghostwriting began
with Professor Goldschmidt's article, In Defense of Ghostwriting.124 Goldschmidt offered in-depth support for the practice, by
both refuting criticisms and by offering new arguments to justify it.125 Subsequent ethics opinions, including a 2007 ABA Eth-

121.

See id. (describing how the standards for investigation and research

are different for pro se parties than for parties represented by counsel).

122. Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App'x 774, 778-79 (10th Cir. 2001) (admonishing a ghostwriting attorney); Washington v. Hampton Rds. Shipping
Ass'n, No. 2:01CV880, 2002 WL 32488476, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Va. May 30, 2002)
("Ghostwriting is in violation of Rule 11."); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915, 917
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (sanctioning an attorney $1000 for violating the
bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655,
674 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (sanctioning an attorney $11,290.05 for violating
the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770-71
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (admonishing an attorney for violating the bankruptcy
court equivalent to Rule 11).
123. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck &
Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); accord Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (noting that ghostwriting is improper even though it may
not per se violate Rule 11).
124. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14.
125. Id. at 1178, 1208-09.
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ics Committee formal opinion, followed suit.126 By debunking
myths about ghostwriting and offering justifications for the
practice, proponents hope to encourage these kinds of unbun127
dled services.
Proponents of ghostwriting critique the "undue advantage"
argument on both theoretical and practical levels. 128 The theoretical argument is grounded in Conley v. Gibson, the civil procedure case in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's
complaint will only be dismissed if it "appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim."'129 Defenders of ghostwriting argue that no matter what
degree of liberality a court employs in construing a pro se litigant's pleadings, ultimately the court may not dismiss a case
unless the Conley "no set of facts" requirement is met. 130 The
unfair advantage argument thus fails because each party's
pleading is ultimately treated equally under the Conley standard.
Practically, proponents of ghostwriting argue that pro se litigants receiving ghostwriting assistance will never be given an
undue advantage, because judges can readily recognize when
putative pro se litigants are receiving legal assistance behind
the scenes. 13' According to an ABA Ethics Committee's opinion,
"if the undisclosed lawyer has provided effective assistance, the
fact that a lawyer was involved will be evident to the tribunal." 132 Experience supports this premise, as many courts have
recognized the presence of ghostwriters.13 3
126. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
127. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1209 (arguing that courts need to ensure that access to justice is not limited to either the extremely poor or the extremely rich).
128. Id. at 1157-58; see also N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21 (explaining
that a client's entitlement to confidentiality may provide "an initial thrust
against disclosure" in limited scope representation).
129. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Many scholars note, however, that
even though the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the Conley standard in
Twombly, any new limits are likely to apply only in antitrust cases. See, e.g.,
Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007), http://www.law
.northwestern.edulawreview/colloquy/2007/31/LRColl2007n3lBradley.pdf (arguing that Twombly "did not rework pleading rules across the board" and that
it merely "modif[ied] the elements of an antitrust conspiracy claim").
130. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1157.
131. ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Fin. Instruments Group, Ltd. v. Leung, 30 F. App'x 915, 916

1264

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1246

To respond to the criticism that ghostwriters violate Rule
11 by escaping the certification requirement, proponents advance two alternative hypotheses. The first, a strict reading of
the rule, maintains that an attorney's limited representation is
finished prior to submitting any court documents. 3 4 Under this
rationale, ghostwriters are under no obligation to disclose their
representation because the pro se litigant assumes all of the
rule's responsibilities by being the one who submits the documents to the court. 135 Alternatively, Goldschmidt argues that
any Rule 11 concerns are moot, because, pursuant to the 1993
advisory committee notes, ghostwriters may be subject to sanc136
tions even if they choose not to disclose their assistance.
When putative pro se parties make frivolous assertions that violate the rule, for example, courts have the broad authority to
sanction anyone responsible, and may even impose sanctions
exclusively on individuals like ghostwriters who do not sign the
documents presented in court.137
The most compelling justification for ghostwriting is that it
increases low-income litigants' access to civil justice. 138 Relying
on the vast need for legal services among low-income litigants, 139 proponents argue that for many, "some legal assisn.1 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Leung's pleadings before this court and the district court
demonstrate an obvious legal sophistication, a complete familiarity with the
rules of civil procedure, and an excellent command of the English language.");
United States v. Bell, 217 F.R.D. 335, 339 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 2003) ("The court
notes with interest that Bell's objections include citations prepared in Bluebook format. These documents strongly suggest the assistance of a legally
trained person who is ghostwriting Mr. Bell's legal arguments."); Watkins v.
Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998 WL 312124, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June
5, 1998) ("Despite [the Plaintiff's] nominal pro se status, it seems pretty clear
that someone familiar with legal practice and procedure has had a major hand
in drafting the Complaint.").
134. See Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp.
1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997).
135. See id.
136. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1174.
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendments, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 589 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Advisory
Notes] ("When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order
to determine whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms,
or parties either in addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the
person actually making the representation to the court.").
138. Farley, supra note 21, at 585-86 (stating that limited appearances for
low-income litigants increase their access to justice); Goldschmidt, supra note
14, at 1208; Adams, supra note 30, at 306-13 (stating that pro se litigation
causes delays and increases the chance for litigants to lose).
139. See, e.g., ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS, supra note 36, at 8 (concluding
that "many low- and moderate-income Americans confront legal issues in their
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tance is better than none." 140 Providing unbundled services like

ghostwriting meets a critical need that legal service organiza14 1
tions and pro bono clinics simply cannot fulfill.

In addition, proponents emphasize that ghostwriting meets
the needs of many clients in practice areas in which pleadings
normally constitute the bulk of an attorney's work. 142 This is
especially true in areas like family law: "Often a party whose
spouse has filed for a divorce simply needs to file an Answer ....Then the party will be able to negotiate with his or

her spouse or the spouse's lawyer to resolve the issues of the
case."'14 3 Permitting ghostwriting in these practice areas makes

pro se litigants to
sense, because concerns about the inability of 44
effectively pursue their case would not apply. 1
The most recent justification for ghostwriting is rooted in
client confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. 145 This
argument recognizes that on some occasions, an attorney may
have valid reasons to keep secret the fact of legal assistance,
such as a desire to represent an unpopular litigant.146 In these
instances, Model Rule 1.6, which imposes a duty on attorneys
to keep in confidence "information relating to the representation of a client," may shield the client from divulging the attorney's identity. 147 Although it is unclear whether the identity of
the attorney constitutes such "information," the public policy of
lives and receive no help"); JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (compiling national and state studies of pro se representation, and concluding that "less
than one in five-20 percent-of those requiring civil legal assistance actually
receive it").
140. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1206.
141. See Farley, supra note 21, at 563 (explaining that legal services organizations and pro bono programs only meet fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
overall need of the nation's poor). Indeed, one jurisdiction considers increasing
low-income litigants' access to civil justice of such importance that it permits
ghostwriting only as part of an organized, nonprofit program to provide legal
assistance to people of limited means. See N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21.
142. See Swank, supra note 15, at 376 (documenting the proliferation of pro
se litigation in "traffic, landlord/tenant, and child support or other domestic
relations issues").
143. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1147 (internal citation omitted); see
also David L. Walther, Ghostwritersin the Sky, 17 AM. J. FAM. L. 61, 61 (2003)
(explaining that one of the more "common forms" of unbundled services in marital settlements is "ghost writing").
144. See, e.g., Olvera v. Edmundson, No. 1:01CV74-C, 2001 WL 1019385, at
*1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. June 15, 2001) (arguing that pro se litigants are "ill equipped
to prosecute the complex issues raised without continued legal assistance").
145. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1197-1205.
146. Id. at 1197-98.
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004).
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148
promoting legal representation may justify nondisclosure.
The identity of the attorney may also be privileged, especially if
the client "directs it be So."149 Goldschmidt, for example, concluded that "insufficient attention" has been paid to the confidentiality and attorney-client privilege inherent in ghostwriting, but that in an "appropriate case," these doctrines may
prevent disclosure. 150
In sum, proponents of ghostwriting seek to debunk courts'
criticisms of the practice, while also emphasizing the benefits of
ghostwriting. Such arguments must be taken into account in
Part III to ensure that any solution yields these same advantages. Part II analyzes previous solutions to concerns raised by
ghostwriting, and indicates how each remedy fails.

II. PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WITH
GHOSTWRITING
Previous solutions to the problems with ghostwriting can
be classified into three categories. At one end of the spectrum,
some authorities suggest that ghostwriting does not violate ethical or procedural rules, and thus does not merit any change in
those rules. 151 Their "solution" to ghostwriting, in short, is
maintaining the status quo. Representing the other extreme,
some courts and commentators argue that ghostwriting clearly
contravenes ethical and procedural rules. 152 As a solution, these
authorities suggest that only mandatory disclosure of the
ghostwriting attorney's identity will suffice. 153 Finally, some
commentators recognize procedural and ethical concerns with
ghostwriting, but argue for so-called anonymous disclosure
whereunder a ghostwriting attorney merely discloses the fact of
154
assistance, rather than his or her identity.
148.

Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1197-1203; see also ABA Formal Op.

07-446, supra note 90 (noting that an attorney "may be obliged under Rules
1.2 and 1.6 not to reveal the fact of the representation").
149. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1204.
150. Id. at 1204-05.
151. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 ('We conclude that
there is no prohibition in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct against undisclosed assistance to pro se litigants, as long as the lawyer does not do so in
a manner that violates rules that otherwise would apply to the lawyer's conduct."); Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1208-09.
152. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd.of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231
(D. Colo. 1994); Conn. Informal Op. 98-5, supra note 96; Rothermich, supra

note 14, at 2712.
153. E.g., Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2711-12.
154. See, e.g., ABA Informal Op. 1414, supra note 54 (arguing that "exten-
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Unfortunately, these solutions fall short of resolving the
ethical and procedural issues arising from ghostwriting. Proponents fail to adequately address the fundamental procedural
problems of fairness and efficiency implicated by the practice.
Anonymous disclosure, while addressing fairness concerns,
does not remedy the inefficiencies caused by ghostwriting, especially with respect to Rule 11. Finally, proposals to mandate
disclosure-at least those that do not specify how attorneys will
be compelled to identify themselves-fail to offer ghostwriters
incentives to disclose their assistance.
Part II uncovers these deficiencies by analyzing previous
solutions from an exclusively procedural perspective. A procedural analysis, which focuses on whether a particular practice
comports with judicial goals of fairness and efficiency, avoids
the seemingly intractable debates over the ethics of ghostwriting. 155 More to the point, a procedural solution effectively renders any ethical ambiguities surrounding the practice moot, because most ethics opinions acknowledge that relevant court
rules have supremacy over ethics opinions. 156 As one ethics
board wrote, implications of ghostwriting are "first and foremost a question of procedural law to be answered by the
courts."'1 57 This Part thus critiques past procedural discussions
of ghostwriting as a foundation for the solution proposed in
Part III.

sive undisclosed participation" by an attorney is improper, but leaving the
door open for more limited participation); Weeman, supra note 51, at 1056-61
(discussing the states that adhere to an "anonymous disclosure" approach, and
recommending such an approach for Arizona).
155. See, e.g., Weeman, supra note 51, at 1066 (noting that the "schism"

between proponents of ghostwriting and those opposing it has widened, and
that confusion surrounding the ethics of ghostwriting has escalated).
156. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90 ("We assume a jurisdiction

where no law or tribunal rule requires disclosure of such participation ... or
otherwise regulates such undisclosed advice or drafting."); Ariz. Ethics Op. 0506, supra note 2 (noting that the opinion does not revisit the committee's conclusion that ghostwriting may be prohibited by Rule 11, and that the legal
boundaries of ghostwriting should be defined by those "with requisite authority"); N.J. Ethics Op. 713, supra note 21 (failing to comment on Rule l's applicability to ghostwriting because "[t]his Committee has no jurisdiction over
questions of federal civil procedure"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. 613 (1990) (noting that lawyers should be "mindful of any court
rule or authoritative judicial determinations" concerning ghostwriting); L.A.
County Formal Op. 502, supra note 2 (sanctioning ghostwriting as long as
there is "no court rule to the contrary").
157. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. KBA E-343 (1991).
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A. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NONDISCLOSURE APPROACH
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (ABA Committee) and Professor Goldschmidt are the two
foremost authorities that advocate ghostwriting without any
disclosure. 158 Both sources, for example, attack the undue advantage argument by explaining how courts ordinarily recognize ghostwritten pleadings. 159 Each argues that pro se litigants receiving ghostwriting assistance will not be given an
undue advantage, either because courts will not construe effectively crafted documents liberally, or because ineffectively
drafted documents will, by their nature, not provide the litigant
160
with any benefit over an adversary.
While both authorities are likely correct that courts refuse
to give obviously ghostwritten documents the leniency normally
accorded to pro se parties,1 61 they fail to address a corollary of
the advantage argument-that once a pro se litigant has submitted a ghostwritten document, she has already received an
unfair advantage over her represented counterpart. In other
words, ghostwriting gives pro se litigants two bites at the proverbial pleadings apple. 162 The unfairness lies not in the hypothetical discrepancy in pleading standards, but rather in the
opportunities the pro se litigant has to achieve the minimally
sufficient pleadings. While represented parties would only be
afforded one opportunity to have their pleadings construed advantageously, the putative pro se litigant would be given the
additional safety net of liberal construction if the attorney's
63
ghostwriting assistance turned out to be ineffective.
158. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note
14, at 1208-09.
159. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note
14, at 1178.
160. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; Goldschmidt, supra note
14, at 1157-58.
161. See, e.g., Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App'x 774, 779 (10th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that the liberal construction normally afforded to pro se litigants
is "no longer warranted" because of the presence of a ghostwriter); cf. Goktepe
v. Lawrence, No. 3:03CV89, 2005 WL 293491, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 2005)
(refusing to construe the putative pro se litigant's pleadings "using the liberal
standard typically afforded to pro se litigants in the past" because the litigant
was actually an attorney).
162. See In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006)
(arguing that a ghostwriter should not get a free bite "at the apple" of pleadings).
163. Of course, both represented parties and pro se litigants do have the
ability to amend their pleadings once as a matter of course. FED. R. Civ. P.
15(a).
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Moreover, both Goldschmidt and the ABA Committee fail
to recognize that even if ghostwriting does not afford pro se litigants an actual advantage, it gives rise to an appearance of
impropriety that is contrary to public policy.164 On several occasions, the Supreme Court has underscored the "significant"
public interest in preventing even the appearance of impropriety. 165 Although this interest more frequently arises in the context of public elections, 166 the Court has also concluded that in
judicial proceedings, public policy militates towards preventing
any improper appearances, such as those that may arise from
ghostwriting. 167 Permitting the practice without any disclosure
would run contrary to this expressed public policy interest.
The ABA Committee and Professor Goldschmidt differ on
whether ghostwriting violates Rule 11.168 On one hand, the
Committee argues that ghostwriting does not contravene the
rule, because only lawyers who physically sign pleadings make
the affirmative statements that invoke Rule 11.169 On the other
hand, Goldschmidt correctly points out that ghostwriters may
fall under the ambit of Rule 11: "[I]n appropriate cases, a
ghostwriter attorney may be hailed into court, under Rule 11 or
70
the inherent power of the court, and be subject to sanctions."'
Goldschmidt persuasively cites the advisory committee notes to
Rule 11 for the proposition that even attorneys who do not sign
pleadings or other documents may be subject to the rule. 171
164. See Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck
& Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *11-12, *16 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007)
(discussing how ghostwriting may raise an appearance of impropriety, and
later, asserting that ghostwriting violates public policy).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 482 (1995).
166. See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).
167. Cf. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 867
(1988) (discussing the appearance of impropriety created by a judge who failed
to recuse himself as a federal statute required); Young v. U.S. ex rel Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) (noting the appearance of impropriety when
a judge appointed a prosecutor with personal interests in the prosecution).
168. Compare Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1169-78 (arguing that
ghostwriters may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions), with ABA Formal Op. 07446, supra note 90 (arguing that ghostwriters are only bound by Rule 11 if
they sign pleadings and thereby make an affirmative statement).
169. See ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90; accord Kircher v. Charter
Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL 4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21,
2007) (noting the plaintiff's argument that Rule 11 does not apply to "nonsigner[s] or non-presenter[s]").
170. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1174.
171. Id. (citing 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589).
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Unfortunately, neither authority reaches the correct result
concerning the applicability of Rule 11 to ghostwriting. First,
the ABA Committee relies on an unduly narrow view of Rule 11
as applying only to attorneys or parties who physically sign
documents. 172 The ABA Committee ignores both the purpose
behind Rule 11,173 as well as the advisory committee notes that
explicate the rule's meaning. 174 A fundamental Rule 11 principle is that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to
refrain from conduct that makes administering civil actions unjust or inefficient. 175 Given that many courts bemoan both the
unfairness 176 and the inefficiency1 77 of ghostwriting, the ABA
Committee's narrow reading of Rule 11 misses the mark, especially given courts' broad authority to sanction anyone "respon178
sible" for violating the rule.
Goldschmidt also errs in concluding that absent a reasonable belief that Rule 11 has been violated, there is no reason to
compel disclosure of the ghostwriter's identity. 179 This argument ignores the Federal Rules' goals of fairness and efficiency,
and problematically places the burden on courts to compel disclosure of the ghostwriter's identity,1 8 0 a course of action that is
less efficient than mandatory disclosure. In fact, nothing in
Goldschmidt's logic would require any attorney to certify that
her factual and legal assertions had a reasonable basis. Under
his paradigm, if a court were concerned about the assertion
made by any party, whether represented or not, it could simply
wait until there were "reasonable grounds to believe a Rule 11
violation occurred," and then compel disclosure of the attorney's
identity.1 8 1 Such a pleading regime would not only be inefficient, but would also fail to deter attorneys or parties from preSee ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
173. The purpose behind Rule 11, as well as all of the Federal Rules, is to
"secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED.
172.

R. Civ. P. 1.
174. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 583-92.
175. See id.
176. E.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso
v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 043009, 2007 WL 766349, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007).
177. E.g., In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re
Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re Merriam, 250 B.R.
724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
178. 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 588.
179. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1175.
180. See id. at 1174.
181. Id.
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senting frivolous or improper allegations, an outcome clearly

contrary to the fundamental aims of Rule 11.182
Goldschmidt's final contribution to the ghostwriting debate
is his contention that requiring disclosure of an attorney's identity would violate duties of confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege.1 8 3 While this suggestion largely implicates ethics rules,1 8 4 it is important to address because any proposal requiring disclosure would have to overcome these concerns.
Goldschmidt argues, in essence, that myriad reasons for which
a client chooses not to disclose the fact of legal assistance justify ghostwriting.1 8 5 Applying this argument to an attorney's duty of confidentiality, the mere fact of representation is "information relating to the representation" of a client, which
attorneys must not disclose.' 8 6 Similarly, the identity of an attorney may be protected under the attorney-client privilege because it is a communication made between privileged persons
87
in confidence for the purpose of providing legal assistance.
Goldschmidt's arguments, however, are flawed because
they misapprehend the nature of client confidentiality. By noting that "[t]he issue in ghostwriting is whether the client can
maintain the confidentiality of the fact and identity of their
lawyer,"' 8 8 Goldschmidt assumes that the duty of confidentiality applies to clients. However, Model Rule 1.6 applies specifically to lawyers, and neither the rule itself nor any comments
thereto suggest that clients may invoke the rule to shield their
attorneys' identities. 8 9 Moreover, given that most explanations
for ghostwriting arise out of an attorney's wish to avoid identification, Goldschmidt's speculation that there may be "many
situations in which a client may not wish to make the fact that
they have consulted legal counsel publicly known" is unpersuasive. 190

182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(1).
183. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1199-205.
184. Id. at 1199-202 (discussing how ghostwriting implicates Model Rule
1.6).
185. See id. at 1198.
186.
187.

Id. at 1199 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004)).
Id. at 1203 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68

cmt. c (2000)).
188.
189.

Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004) (failing to discuss

the rule's application to clients).
190. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1200.
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Similarly, when Goldschmidt asserts that a communication
between a lawyer and a client is privileged if the client requests
that it be so, he assumes that clients often will have reasons to
shield the identity of their attorneys. 191 This argument ignores
the vast majority of cases addressing ghostwriting, wherein at192
torneys, not clients, were motivated to shield their identities.
Moreover, even when clients might have valid reasons to shield
their attorney's identity, the analogy Goldschmidt draws is inapt because of the consensus that the mere identity of a client
is not protected by the privilege. 193 While Goldschmidt is correct that courts have not addressed the inverse-whether an
attorney's identity may be privileged-his suggestion that the
privilege might apply to an attorney's identity is speculation at
best.194

Proponents of nondisclosure thus fail to analyze thoroughly
the procedural implications of ghostwriting. As a result, their
proposed "solution" to the problem-that the nature or extent
of a ghostwriter's legal assistance "need not be disclosed"-is
ineffective. 195 While these authorities persuasively note that
most courts refuse to give effectively ghostwritten pleadings a
liberal construction, they ignore both the real and the perceived
unfairness of ghostwriting. Moreover, these authorities fail to
address efficiency concerns, namely, that already overburdened
courts would waste judicial resources identifying ghostwriters.
A different solution is needed to address these procedural concerns.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ANONYMOUS DISCLOSURE APPROACH

Recognizing some of the problems ghostwriting creates,
some authorities support
a middle-ground position, that of
"anonymous disclosure."1 96 Under this approach, a ghostwriting
attorney must declare that pleadings or other papers are "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel," but need not identify herself
191.

Id. at 1203-05.

192.

See, e.g., In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 909-10 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006)

(noting an attorney's attempt to circumvent electronic pleading rules by advis-

ing his client to submit written documents pro se).
193. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir.
1990); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451-52 (6th
Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
194. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1203-04.
195. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 90.
196. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1056.
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to the court. 197 Essentially, this argument is based on the premise that ghostwriting problems arise from a court's ignorance
of the fact of attorney assistance, rather a specific attorney's
identity; as long as a tribunal is aware that a ghostwriter
helped a pro se litigant, it is not necessary for the client to indicate the attorney's identity. 198
Authorities who recommend anonymous disclosure favor
this approach because it eliminates fairness concerns. 199 Anonymous disclosure brings to light the attorney's assistance,
thus removing any possibility that a court would give the litigant undue latitude. 20 0 As long as the court is aware that the
pro se litigant appearing before it has received some form of assistance from an attorney, "the court can [then] determine what
degree of leniency is appropriate." 20
While the anonymous disclosure approach is a useful first
step in solving some of the procedural concerns raised by
ghostwriting, it does not go far enough to alleviate the inefficiencies of the practice. Specifically, failure to mandate disclosure of the attorney's identity places a burden on courts to locate ghostwriters when Rule 11 concerns arise. 202 In the event
that a court needed to contact a ghostwriter, for example because of a concern about the ghostwriter's reasonable investigation into the factual and legal assertions made, the court would
be unable to do so without the attorney's identity. 20 3 While a
court could attempt to compel the pro se litigant to disclose the
attorney's identity, this process would, at best, take up valua197. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (2000); City of N.Y.
Formal Op. 1987-2, supra note 99 (mandating the use of the phrase "Prepared
by Counsel").
198. City of N.Y. Formal Op. 1987-2, supra note 99.
199. Id.
200. See Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Stewart v. Angelone, 186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999)
("[The Court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether
counsel intends to represent him in this case.").
203. For the most prominent example of a court concerned about frivolous
allegations while being unable to identify the alleged ghostwiiter, see Klein v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (condemning a ghostwriter who supported the "irresponsible tactics" of a litigious plaintiff, and characterizing such assistance as "hit-and-run tactics"), and see also
Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 2001) (recounting one attorney's contention that an opponent did not conduct the "requisite pre-filing
investigation of the facts underpinning the complaint's claims" and arguing
that one attorney was using his client's case as a "vehicle to continue his vendetta" against the opposing parties).
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ble judicial resources. 2 04 Even though the attorney would be
subject to Rule 11,205 the difficulty of locating the attorney
might make it impossible to "readily discipline[]" the attor206
ney.
Advocates of anonymous disclosure would likely present
two counterarguments to efficiency concerns. First, they might
question the degree to which courts actually would have to
track down an unidentified ghostwriter, arguing that efficiency
concerns are overblown. Yet the number of recent cases in
which courts have ordered the disclosure of either the identity
of the ghostwriter or a fact related thereto weakens this argument.207 Moreover, even if courts choose not to compel disclosure of the ghostwriter, the inefficiencies of satellite litigation-merely having to conduct hearings or conferences to
address potential consequences of ghostwriting-suggest that
anonymous disclosure does not eliminate the inefficiencies of
208
ghostwriting.
Second, while advocates of anonymous disclosure might
argue that pro se litigants assume responsibility for Rule 11 violations made by the ghostwriter, this answer is insufficient
because it forces inexperienced pro se litigants to "assume the
204. See In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673-74 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2005) (suggesting that ghostwriting wastes judicial resources).
205. Although ghostwriters who anonymously disclose assistance arguably

would not be subject to Rule 11, Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057-58, the language of Rule 11 and the advisory committee's note suggests that anyone responsible for a violation may be subject to sanctions under the rule, see 1993
Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 588.
206. Weeman, supra note 51, at 1057.
207. See Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) ("We therefore order Johnson to disclose to the court
in writing the identity, profession and address of the person who has been assisting her by February 20, 2007."); Blue Chip IR Group, Ltd. v. Furth, No.
2:06CV185 DS, 2006 WL 2350157, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 11, 2006) (ordering a
suspected ghostwriter to "file a Notice of Appearance in compliance with the
rules of this Court if he intended to continue to appear"); Stewart v. Angelone,
186 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Court ORDERS petitioner to identify counsel, and to declare whether counsel intends to represent him in this
case."); In re Brown (Brown 11), 371 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007)
(recounting the court's previous order to an attorney to "make a full disclosure
to the Court regarding any fees he had billed or payments he had accepted"),
amended by 371 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007); cf. Nasrichampang v.
Woodford, No. 04CV2400BTMRBB, 2006 WL 3932924, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3,
2006) (ordering an attorney to acknowledge "future ghostwriting" by signing
"all court documents").
208. Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Employees of Merck &
Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007); In re West, 338
B.R. 906, 910-13 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
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risk" of a lawyer's conduct. From a procedural perspective, such
a regime would be unfair to the pro se litigant, who could be

sanctioned for filing frivolous legal claims of which she was utterly ignorant. Rule 11 clearly does not condone such an outcome; the advisory committee notes indicate that "responsibility for [frivolous contentions of law] is more properly placed
solely on the party's attorneys." 209 In short, any solution must
place responsibility for conducting a reasonable investigation,
and the concomitant possibility of being sanctioned, on the attorney or party who drafts the pleadings.
C.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE APPROACH

Of the three solutions to the problems with ghostwriting,
the mandatory disclosure approach comes closest to promoting
procedural values of fairness and efficiency. It is not surprising
that many of the authorities advocating mandatory disclosure
for ghostwriters are courts, 2 10 for these tribunals are the bodies
that weigh procedural values most frequently. 2 11 In fact, courts
have uniformly condemned ghostwriting, 2 12 emphasizing both
fairness and efficiency in doing so. 2 13 When discussing fairness,
courts reiterate the concern that ghostwriting gives pro se litigants an undue advantage over opposing parties. 214 With regard to efficiency, tribunals have noted that identifying
209.

1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589.

210. E.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 2001); Delso,
2007 WL 766349, at *12-16; Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985-87
(S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1077-79 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868
F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309
F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535,
541-42 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-16 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys., Inc., 326 B.R. 655, 673 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
211. For ethics opinions that advocate mandatory disclosure, see Conn. Informal Op. 98-5, supra note 96 ("It is our opinion that a lawyer who prepares
and controls the content of a pleading, brief or other document to be filed with
a court must, in some form satisfactory to the court, inform the court that the
document was prepared by the lawyer.") and Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics & Conduct, Formal Op. 96-31 (1997), and compare N.J. Ethics
Op. 713, supra note 21 (requiring disclosure when ghostwriting is used as a
tactic "to gain advantage in litigation," while permitting ghostwriting if such
assistance is part of a "non-profit program designed to provide legal assistance
to people of limited means").
212. See Brown I, 354 B.R. at 541 (explaining that ghostwriting has been
met with "universal disfavor" in federal courts).
213. E.g., In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768-70.
214. E.g., Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
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ghostwriters imposes an "extra strain" on courts, 215 and forces
courts to expend unnecessary time adjudicating nondispositive
issues. 2 16 Finally, courts identify both fairness and efficiency
concerns when ghostwriters escape certification requirements
of Rule 11; it is unfair for an opposing party to have to respond
to potentially frivolous claims, and it is inefficient for the courts
to sanction attorneys who are not identified in frivolous docu2 17
ments.
John C. Rothermich supplements these courts' discussions
of the procedural values related to ghostwriting by focusing on
fairness and efficiency concerns in an in-depth manner. 2 18 Rothermich's analysis is the closest any previous commentator
has come to evaluating how procedural values of fairness and
efficiency apply to ghostwriting. His focus on "maximiz[ing]
judicial efficiency" and "protect[ing] litigants from having to defend themselves against unfounded claims" directly implicates
the procedural values inherent in the Federal Rules. 21 9 In fact,
Rothermich's conclusion-that attorneys should somehow be
compelled to disclose their assistance in drafting pleadings
when they are filed-appears to alleviate the undue advantage,
220
inefficiency, and Rule 11 concerns.
While Rothermich's solution comes closer than any previous attempt to address procedural concerns, it fails to incentivize disclosure in a specific manner. Specifically, Rothermich
offers no model for how to encourage attorneys to disclose their
assistance. 221 He provides no paradigm-whether in the form of
a carrot or a stick-that would alter the current system and its
accompanying ambiguities. Given that several courts have
noted that "there [are] no specific rules dealing with ghostwrit222
ing," this lack of a proposal is surprising.
215. Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 342.
216. See In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 770.
217. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at
*2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) ("It would be patently unfair for Johnson to benefit from the less-stringent standard applied to pro se litigants if, in fact, she is
receiving substantial behind-the-scenes assistance from counsel.").
218. See Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2715-24.
219. Id. at 2716.
220. Id. at 2722.
221. Cf. id. at 2728-29 (concluding that courts and bar associations should
encourage limited scope representation by permitting disclosed assistance, but
failing to offer a model to encourage courts and bar associations to do so).
222. E.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78
(E.D. Va. 1997).
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Experience since publication of Rothermich's article confirms the need for concrete incentives to require disclosure of
attorney assistance. In the nearly ten years since Rothermich
argued for mandatory disclosure, incidents of ghostwriting
have only increased. 223 While there were only a handful of documented cases in 1999, now there are dozens of cases in which
pro se litigants appear to be benefiting from ghostwriters. 224
For some specialty courts like bankruptcy, ghostwriting appears to be increasing with particular intensity. 225 Although
some of these cases merely address the concerns with
ghostwriting in passing or in footnotes, 226 it is clear that
ghostwriting is a much more pervasive issue now than ever. 227

Given the procedural concerns with the practice, this trend
suggests that reformers must take the next step to solve the
ghostwriting problem-incentivizing disclosure through specific
explication of court rules. At the same time, any solution to the
problems with ghostwriting must take into account the growing
need for limited scope representation, especially amongst lowincome litigants. Part III offers such a solution.

223. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (noting that courts around the country
"increasingly are coming to grips with the practice").
224. See, e.g., Kircher v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti, No. 07-13091, 2007 WL
4557714, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007); Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04-C6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007); In re Potter, No. 7-05-

14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Brown
(Brown 11), 371 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007), amended by 371 B.R.
505 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007); In re Brown (Brown 1), 354 B.R. 535, 542
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
225. See, e.g., In re Potter, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3-4; Brown II, 371 B.R. at
493; Brown 1, 354 B.R. at 541-46; In re West, 338 B.R. 906, 914-15 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Cash Media Sys. 326 B.R. 655, 673-75 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2005); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 767-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003); In re
Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 732-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
226. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1
n.1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2007); Edwards v. Creoks Mental Health Serv., Inc.,
No. 05-CV-0454-CVE-SAJ, 2007 WL 2254344, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2007);
Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL
1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007); Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C
6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007); Ariola v. Onondaga
County Sheriffs Dep't, No. 9:04-CV-1262, 2007 WL 119453, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 10, 2007).
227. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (indicating that ghostwriting is a "trendy" legal issue because of its increasing frequency).
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III. EXPANDING RULE 11 AS A SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS
WITH GHOSTWRITING
In developing a solution to the procedural concerns raised
by ghostwriting, it is important to delineate the objectives of
any such proposal. The above analysis suggests four goals that
reformers to procedural rules should strive to achieve. First,
changes to procedural rules must resolve any unfairness,
whether real or perceived, that pro se litigants receive through
ghostwriting. Second, any solution must eliminate procedural
inefficiencies inherent in the practice. Third, procedural reforms must clearly bring attorneys giving limited scope representation under the auspices of Rule 11; even though ghostwriters arguably already may be subject to sanction under the
rule, courts' confusion with the applicability of Rule 11 to
ghostwriting warrants an increase in clarity. 228 Finally, reforms must alleviate proponents' concerns that mandatory disclosure would conscript attorneys into full-scope representations.
This Part strives to achieve these goals by recommending
amendments to Rule 11. Section A discusses the advantages of
state and local rules that have authorized limited scope representation. Section B then synthesizes these arguments and offers item-by-item revisions to Rule 11. This proposal is designed to resolve procedural concerns of fairness and efficiency
in ghostwriting, while ensuring that low-income litigants are
not disadvantaged under a system of mandatory disclosure.
A. REVISIONS TO STATE COURT ANALOGS TO RULE 11

Of the revisions to state court pleading rules, the most basic addition is a provision expressly allowing limited representation in litigation. Colorado, for example, expressly declares
that attorneys may prepare court documents for pro se litigants, but must include "the attorney's name, address, telephone number and registration number." 229 Maine's version of
228.

Compare In re West, 338 B.R. at 915, 917 (sanctioning an attorney

$1000 for violating the bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11), and In re Cash Media, 326 B.R. at 674 (sanctioning an attorney $11,290.05 for violating the
bankruptcy equivalent to Rule 11), with Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the
Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (stating that ghostwriting does not violate Rule 11, but
that it "contravene[s] the spirit" of the rule), and Kircher, 2007 WL 4557714,
at *4 (noting that while ghostwriting may not violate Rule 11, it is still improper).
229. COLO. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
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Rule 11 also expressly authorizes limited appearances for attorneys, and requires attorneys to "state precisely the scope of
the limited representation." 230 Various courts in Washington,
Florida, and Nevada have adopted similar rules that authorize
attorneys to restrict their representation to drafting court documents. 231 Such rules meet the conscription objective by allaying attorney fears that their assistance in drafting a document
232
will later turn into full-service representation.
State pleading rules also feature an express certification
requirement for drafters of otherwise pro se parties' documents.
Colorado's version of Rule 11 mandates that attorneys providing drafting assistance attest that the document is wellgrounded in fact, is warranted by existing law, and is not intended for any improper purposes. 233 A Washington Superior
Court rule also acknowledges that attorneys may help "to draft
a pleading, motion or document filed by the otherwise selfrepresented person," so long as the attorney makes the usual
234
certification that the document is not otherwise improper.
The benefit of these rules is that they ensure that both
represented parties and pro se litigants conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the facts and law of claims asserted in court.
Finally, an important corollary to the certification requirement is a provision that permits attorneys to rely on their
clients' recounting of facts in most circumstances. 2 35 Specifically, this provision recognizes that certification could prove burdensome in limited scope representations, and so authorizes an
attorney providing such representations to "rely on the pro se
party's representation of facts," unless the attorney believes
236
that the representations are "false or materially insufficient."
This provision is beneficial because it addresses the concern
that "the lawyer [in a limited scope representation] may have

230.

ME. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

231.

See FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a);

WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R.

11(b).

232. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198 (indicating that a desire to
avoid being conscripted into a full-service representation is one justification
for ghostwriting); MSBA REPORT, supra note 79, at 7 (explaining that "fear of
having to stay on a case forever" and "being unable to withdraw" is one principal concern related to unbundled legal services).
233. COLO. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
234.
235.

WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11(b).
See COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11(b).

236.

COLO. R. CIv. P. 11(b).
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to spend so much time on the case that limited representation
237
is no longer cost-effective."
B. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RULE 11
Incorporating these state court innovations, this Section
proposes subdivision-by-subdivision changes to Federal Rule
11.238 Each of the suggested revisions attempts to broaden the
rule to account for the changing nature of attorney-client representation manifested in ghostwriting. Overall, the proposed
changes draw on state templates to bring ghostwriters under
the auspices of Rule 11, to promote procedural goals of fairness
and efficiency, and to provide clarity to attorneys who wish to
provide limited scope representation.
Each subsection below revises provisions in Rule 11 to regulate ghostwriting. Suggested revisions are shown in italics,
and language to be omitted is stricken. The revisions begin
with the signature requirement in Rule 11(a), and continue
through the certification and sanctions portions in Rule 11(b)
and (c). Other portions of the rule requiring no revisions, such
as Rule 11(c)(1), (c)(3) and (d), are not further addressed here.
Following each proposed change is a discussion of the benefits
and disadvantages of amending the rule, the ultimate objective
of which is to properly weigh procedural values that arise from
the practice of ghostwriting.
1. The Signature Requirement
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper substantially prepared by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the pa-ry-4s

not rzpresented by an attcrncy pleading, written motion, or other paper is not substantially prepared by an attorney, it shall be signed by
the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone
number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
Anu&iged-paper not signed by its drafter shall be stricken unless
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to
the attention of the attorney or party.

First, the language "substantially prepared by an attorney"
is added to indicate exactly when an attorney must sign a court
document. Focusing on who prepares it, rather than on wheth237. Tebo, supra note 82, at 17.
238. While this Section only discusses Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
its analysis is equally applicable to similar rules in other federal and state
courts. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.

2008]

GHOSTWRITING

1281

er an individual is "represented," addresses the precise problem
with ghostwriting-when an attorney assists a client with
drafting, but nevertheless has the client present it to the tribunal. Adding the word "substantial" also comports with some
courts' hesitancy to sanction ghostwriters who merely provide
informal advice to friends or colleagues. 239 To provide further
clarity, comments to the new amendments would elaborate on
the meaning of the term "substantial assistance" by referencing
previous decisions.240

Second, permitting courts to strike papers not signed by
their drafters has the distinct benefit of imposing consequences
on ghostwriters who conceal their assistance. Broadening the
rule, in other words, ensures that documents signed by putative pro se litigants, but obviously written by an attorney, could
be stricken. Given courts' demonstrated ability to spot attorney-assisted pleadings, 24 1 this possibility is the first incentive
to encourage ghostwriters to identify themselves to a tribunal.
While opponents might criticize this provision as unfairly punishing a pro se litigant for an attorney's failure to sign a document, this criticism is mitigated by the coincidence of interests between a drafting attorney and her client. Knowing that
her client could be harmed irreparably by having her pleadings
stricken, a ghostwriting attorney would not likely risk violating
the rule, especially given that some attorneys ghostwrite specifically to help low-income or unpopular litigants who otherwise
cannot obtain legal representation. 242
2. The Certification Requirement
(b) Representations to Court.

239. See, e.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(explaining that an attorney must play a "substantial role in the litigation" to
qualify as a ghostwriter); In re Brown (Brown I), 354 B.R. 535, 544 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 2006) (noting that the drafting of pleadings constitutes substantial
assistance); cf. In re Eastlick, 349 B.R. 216, 221 n.17 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004)
(explaining that preparation of a bankruptcy petition, schedules, and statements constitutes "material" participation, which is improper if not disclosed).
240. See, e.g., Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
241. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1
n.1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2007); Edwards v. Creoks Mental Health Serv., Inc.,
No. 05-CV-0454-CVE-SAJ, 2007 WL 2254344, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2007);
Johnson v. City of Joliet, No. 04 C 6426, 2007 WL 495258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
13, 2007); In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071, 2007 WL 2363104, at *3 (Bankr.
D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2007).
242. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1147, 1198.
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(1) Full Service Representation. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,(A) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(B) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law;
(C) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support, or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery;
(D) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence,
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
There is only one major change in the first provision of
Rule 11(b): the entire rule is divided into "full service represen-

tation" and "limited scope representation" subparts. As a result, the four certification requirements currently in Rule
11(b)(1)-(4) would be relabeled 11(b)(1)(A)-(D). The substance
of these provisions remains the same.
(2) Limited Scope Representation. An attorney may provide drafting assistance to an otherwise pro se party in a court proceeding.
Pleadings, written motions or other papers filed by the pro se party
that were prepared with substantialdraftingassistanceof an attorney
shall include the attorney's name, address, telephone number and registration number. In drafting the pleading, written motion or other
paper, the attorney certifies that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information and belief, formed after a reasonableinquiry under
the circumstances, subdivisions (A) through (D) of subsection (b)(1) of
this rule are met. The attorney in making this inquiry may rely on the
pro se party's representationof facts, unless the attorney has reason to
believe that such representationsare false or materially insufficient, in
which case the attorney shall make an independent reasonable inquiry
into the facts.

There are several substantial changes to this subdivision,
the most important of which is the acknowledgement that an
attorney's representation of a party need not last for the entire
duration of a civil action. Instead, by separating the certification provisions of the rule into "full service" and "limited scope"
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portions, the Federal Rules would for the first time expressly
24 3
permit attorneys to provide discrete task representation.
Equally important are the substantive additions to Rule
11(b). First, the provision allowing attorneys to draft documents for otherwise pro se parties will, as did the Colorado and
Maine rules, allay fears that drafting lawyers will later be conscripted into full-service representation. 244 The requirement
that an assisting attorney disclose his identity recognizes fairness and efficiency concerns, and applying the certification requirements of Rule 11 also acknowledges these procedural values. Finally, to address potential concerns about the "costeffectiveness" of limited scope representation, 245 the proposed
revisions explain that a reasonable inquiry may involve less
work in a limited task representation than a full-service representation.
Opponents of these changes might argue that they would
not alleviate the conscription concern. In other words, critics
might assert that the proposed revisions do not expressly indicate when an attorney may withdraw from a limited scope representation. Unlike court rules in Florida and Nevada, 246 the
above provision does not permit attorney withdrawal without
leave of court, an omission that opponents could use to undermine the proposed rule's efficacy.
However, the proposed changes, when combined with additional commentary to the rule, go as far as any revisions to
Rule 11 can while still remaining true to its substance. Rule 11,
above all else, concerns an attorney's duties to conduct a reasonable investigation and to certify such an effort to relevant
tribunals. 247 Adding any withdrawal provisions would not
square with this main purpose; indeed, the Florida and Nevada
withdrawal provisions are not found in Rule 11 equivalents
likely for this very reason. 248 Still, the language in the rule ex243. Cf. 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 583-92 (failing to distinguish between full-service and limited scope representations in previous iterations of Rule 11); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983
amendments, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201 (1983) (same).
244. See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1198; MSBA REPORT, supra note
79, at 7.
245. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 17 (raising concerns about the costeffectiveness of limited scope representation).
246. See FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a).
247. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 584-85.
248. Cf. FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.040(a)-(d) (failing to address the signature
and certification requirements in Rule 11); 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. NEV. R. 5.28(a)
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pressly permitting an attorney to provide drafting assistance to
otherwise pro se parties could hardly be clearer in approving
the kind of limited representation inherent in ghostwriting, as
long as the attorney discloses her identity. Any ambiguities
surrounding
when an attorney may withdraw from
representing a pro se client can be addressed in commentary to
the rule, a compromise that addresses opponents' concerns
while limiting the proposed changes a more practical level.
Overall, the proposed revisions largely achieve the four objectives outlined at the beginning of this Section. The first-to
eliminate any real or perceived unfairness present in
ghostwriting-is clearly realized because the proposed rule requires attorneys to identify themselves. More than any previous proposal, the new rule also eliminates inefficiencies that
ghostwriting places on courts, by providing concrete language
courts can adopt to incentivize disclosure. In other words, because the new rule expressly requires ghostwriters to disclose
their assistance, it avoids the de facto burden that the practice
places on courts to identify anonymous ghostwriters. Third,
forcing drafting attorneys to bear the certification burden
avoids potential unfairness to pro se litigants who might otherwise have to "assume the risk" of sanctions even for an attorney's legal errors. Finally, the last objective-making clear that
limited drafting assistance will not turn into full-scale representations-is addressed by the language permitting drafting
assistance, and may also be discussed in comments to the proposed rule.
3.

Sanctions
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party or pro se litigant whose legal assertions were
drafted by an attorney for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).

There is only one minor change of note to the sanctions
provision of Rule 11. The clause in Rule 11(c)(2)(A) precluding
the award of monetary sanctions against a represented party
for frivolous legal contentions should be expanded to apply to
pro se litigants who rely on limited drafting assistance from an
attorney. This avoids the potential unfairness that could result
were a pro se litigant to sign pleadings drafted by an attorney
24 9
and later be sanctioned.
(same).
249. See 1993 Advisory Notes, supra note 137, at 589 (noting that responsibility for violations of Rule 11(b)(2) "is more properly placed solely on the
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Much more importantly, applying the broad sanctions provisions to the updated certification rule would yield significant
incentives for limited representation attorneys to disclose their
assistance. Knowing that failure to do so would be a per se violation of subdivision (b), ghostwriting attorneys would be on
notice that such action could trigger the array of sanctions
listed in the rule. 250 Combining currently existing sanctions
provisions with the proposed certification and representation
rules would yield the very incentives for disclosure that previous proposals failed to provide. 25 1 The result would be a rule
that, for the first time, acknowledges the changing nature of attorney-client representation and corrects the unfairness and
inefficiencies that have arisen as a result of the rule's failure to
252
address ghostwriting.
4.

Process for Revising Rule 11

The obstacles to amending Rule 11 are the strongest arguments against this proposal, for in the nearly seventy-year
history of the rule, it has only been amended twice, 25 3 and the
process of amending the rules has been described as "glacial." 254 Specifically, amending the Federal Rules requires seven steps: initial consideration by the advisory committee, publication of proposed amendments and public comment,
consideration of the public comments and final submission of
the amendments to the Standing Committee of the Federal
Judicial Conference, approval by the Standing Committee,
Judicial Conference approval, Supreme Court approval, and
party's attorneys" than on a represented party).
250. Possible sanctions under Rule 11 include directives of a nonmonetary
nature, orders to pay a penalty into court, and reasonable attorneys' fees sufficient to deter repetition of violative conduct. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(2).
251. Cf. Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2728-29 (concluding that courts
should encourage limited scope representation by permitting disclosed assistance, but failing to offer a model to encourage courts and bar associations to
do this).
252. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that Rule 11 does not expressly address ghostwriting); Laremont-Lopez v.
Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(same); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo.
1994) (same).
253. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the
FederalRules of Civil Procedureand Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (explaining
that, to that date, Rule 11 had only been amended twice).
254. Jeremy A. Colby, E-SOP's Fables: Recent Developments in Electronic
Service of Process, J. INTERNET L., June 2006, at 3, 5.
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congressional review. 255 The most recent revision to Rule 11
demonstrates that years might pass from the time amendments
256
are proposed to when they are ultimately adopted.
Yet the two previous revisions to Rule 11 suggest that the
above amendments would be feasible. The 1993 revisions, for
example, addressed a proliferation in satellite litigation caused
by the 1983 amendments to the rule. 257 Just as the 1993
amendments attempted to reduce the expenditure of judicial
resources, 258 the proposed amendments would increase the efficiency of judicial proceedings by preventing courts from having
to hold conferences and hearings to identify potential ghostwriters. Especially as the salience of ghostwriting increases and its
inefficient effects become felt more appreciably, 259 courts facing
the same problem could readily turn to the same solution of
amending the rule as a way of increasing courtroom efficiency.
In addition, the proposed changes would serve a second
justification for the 1993 revisions-to lessen the "chilling effect" of previous versions of the rule.2 60 As Professor Goldschmidt persuasively argues, the current uncertainty about the
propriety of ghostwriting has had a chilling effect on those who
wish to provide limited assistance to otherwise pro se parties.26 1 For years, legal service organizations have wished to
provide this representation, but have feared that providing
some assistance would tax their resources if it later turned into
full-service representation. 262 Amending the rule to authorize
limited representations will provide the clarity well-meaning
attorneys need to increase low-income litigants' access to civil
justice.
Given the plight of so many low-income civil litigants like
Rosann Delso and the procedural benefits amending Rule 11
would yield, the cost of doing so-having to endure the slow255. Sonia Salinas, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who Foots the
Bill?, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1641 n.15 (2005).
256. See Hart, supra note 253, at 12 (describing how the 1993 amendments
were proposed in 1990).
257. See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 112, at 100-01.
258. See id.
259. See Tebo, supra note 82, at 16 (explaining that courts around the
country "increasingly are coming to grips with the practice" of ghostwriting).
260. Hart, supra note 253, at 11-12.
261. Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 1184.
262. See, e.g., Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 1994-2
(1994) (recounting a legal service organization attorney's request for an advisory opinion on the ethics of ghostwriting).
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moving machinery of the Federal Judicial Conference-is simply too small to reject this proposal. Approximately eighty percent of low-income individuals have legal needs that go unmet, 263 and fifty percent of those requesting assistance from

legal services programs are turned away due to a lack of program resources. 264 In 2006, over forty percent of federal district
court appeals in civil cases came from pro se litigants. 265 These
figures, when combined with the increasingly pervasive nature
of ghostwriting in federal courts, demand a solution that both
resolves procedural concerns and eliminates barriers to legal
representation. While slow to enact, amending Rule 11 is just
such a proposal.
CONCLUSION
Current rules of civil procedure do not effectively regulate
the practice of ghostwriting. While in theory Rule 11 sanctions
may be imposed on attorneys who fail to disclose their assistance, in practice this is unlikely to occur because of the difficulty courts face in locating ghostwriters. Moreover, the increasing prevalence of ghostwriting highlights concerns about
both the ethics of the practice and the extent to which
ghostwriting is consistent with procedural values. As the above
analysis suggests, ghostwriting raises fairness concerns, both
because putative pro se litigants are given two opportunities to
submit minimally sufficient pleadings, and because the practice
raises an appearance of impropriety. Ghostwriting is also inefficient because it places a burden on courts to locate the
ghostwriters if the need ever arises.
To alleviate efficiency concerns caused by ghostwriting, as
well as to prevent any real or perceived unfairness, reformers
should revise Rule 11 to acknowledge limited scope representation. Such a change would borrow from state court templates,
and would encourage otherwise hesitant attorneys to provide
discrete task representation. Given the extreme need for pro se
representation, such a rule will further equal justice for low-

263.

JUSTICE GAP, supra note 36, at 18 (compiling national and state stu-

dies of pro se representation, and concluding that "less than one in five-20
percent-of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive it").
264. Id. at 4.
265. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Judicial Facts and Figures
(last
tbl.2.4, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table2O4.pdf
visited Mar. 12, 2008) (providing data on the number of pro se cases filed in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, excluding the Federal Circuit).

1288

MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW

[92:1246

income civil litigants. Adopting the proposed revisions to Rule
11 will also promote fairness by preventing any undue advantage that might attach to putative pro se litigants who receive
ghostwriting assistance, and will promote efficiency by enabling courts to easily identify drafters of court documents. In
short, an expanded Rule 11 can capture the ghost that is
haunting many civil courts today.

